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What Law Must Lawyers Know? 
JOAN W. HOWARTH† 
What constitutes the body of legal knowledge that every lawyer must 
possess? I used to know, or think I did, but no longer. I suspect no one else 
knows either. This difficult question is not just an intriguing theoretical 
matter but also an urgent, practical problem. Licensing regulators assume 
that minimal competence in any profession requires certain fundamental 
knowledge, skills, and abilities.1 Bar examiners must determine what 
knowledge, skills, and abilities are necessary for minimum competence as 
an attorney and then design tests and other requirements to attempt to align 
licensure with minimum competence. Today’s tangled attorney licensing 
puzzle cannot be solved without better answers to this foundational question: 
what law must every lawyer know? 
I. AN INITIAL CATEGORICAL QUANDARY: CAN WE SEPARATE 
KNOWLEDGE FROM SKILLS AND ABILITY? 
Of the “knowledge, skills, and abilities” triad, my focus is knowledge. 
 
† Distinguished Visiting Professor, Boyd School of Law, UNLV; Dean Emerita, Michigan State 
University College of Law. I thank the Boyd School of Law for generous research support and Claudia 
Angelos, Sara Berman, Mary Lu Bilek, Carol Chomsky, Andi Curcio, Davida Finger, Alli Gerkman, 
Catherine Grosso, Eileen Kaufman, Debby Merritt, Patty Salkin, Elaine Shoben, Judith Wegner, Robin 
West, and participants in the West Coast Rhetoric Workshop for helpful comments and ideas. 
1 “[T]ests used for credentialing are designed to verify that candidates have mastered the 
knowledge, skills and abilities (KSAs) deemed necessary for work in a profession.” Mark B. Raymond, 
Job Analysis, Practice Analysis and the Content of Credentialing Examinations, in HANDBOOK OF TEST 
DEVELOPMENT 144 (Suzanne Lane, Mark R. Raymond & Thomas M. Haladyna eds., 2016); citing to 
AM. EDUC. RES. ASS’N., AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N., & NAT’L COUNCIL ON MEAS. IN EDUC., STANDARDS 
FOR EDUC. AND PSYCHOL. TESTING 174, 174-75 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 STANDARDS]. “Tests used in 
credentialing are designed to determine whether the essential knowledge and skills have been mastered 
by the candidate.” Id. at 175. 
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But the three categories inevitably blur together. The skill or ability to do 
anything requires knowledge about how to do it. The cook learns the 
properties of food and language of recipes to produce an excellent meal.  The 
quarterback knows the vocabulary of football and the names and 
descriptions of plays in the playbook in order to complete a pass.  The skill 
of competent client counseling requires a substantial knowledge base, 
including knowledge about duties to clients, active listening, and whatever 
legal doctrine may be relevant to the client’s concerns. But lines must be 
drawn, however imperfectly. I am following the licensing convention of 
considering knowledge to be linked to but distinct from skills or abilities. 
II. OUR BAR EXAMS TILT TOWARD KNOWLEDGE, NOT SKILLS 
The question of what law lawyers must know is especially salient 
because attorney licensing in the United States stresses knowledge, not 
skills.  Ironically, we know much more about what competent lawyers must 
be able to do than what they/we must know.  Numerous reports and studies 
over decades present a consistent message about what skills or abilities are 
necessary for competence in practicing law.2 Yet current bar exams continue 
to require memorization of extensive knowledge, while ignoring most of 
what we know lawyers must be able to do. 
Too many applicants understand bar exams primarily as tests of 
doctrinal knowledge, probably because the massive memorization of rules 
currently required is the challenge for law graduates who have mastered 
legal analysis. Bar examiners who consider bar exam reform to mean 
changing the subjects tested are also wrongly considering the tests to be 
 
2 See A.B.A. SEC. OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSION TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND 
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT–AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW 
SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP (1992), available at https://www.americanbar. 
org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/2013_legal_education_and_professional_devel
opment_maccrate_report).authcheckdam.pdf [“MacCrate Report”]; Howard Gardiner & Lee S. 
Schulman, The Professions in America Today: Crucial but Fragile, 124 DAEDALUS 13, 1318 (2015); 
Bryant G. Garth & Joanne Martin, Law Schools and the Construction of Competence, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
469, 475, 477 (1993); Marjorie M. Shultz & Sheldon Zedeck, Predicting Law Effectiveness: Broadening 
the Basis for Law School Admissions Decisions, 36 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 620 (2011); Neil Hamilton, 
Empirical Research on the Core Competencies Needed to Practice Law: What Do Clients, New Lawyers, 
and Legal Employers Tell Us?, 83 B. EXAM’R 6, 6-9 (2014) (evaluating survey data from junior and 
senior lawyers in Minnesota, interviews, job analysis studies by the National Conference of Bar 
Examiners, and other studies); INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., FOUNDATIONS 
FOR PRACTICE: THE WHOLE LAWYER AND THE CHARACTER QUOTIENT (2016), available at 
https://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/foundations_for_practice_whole_lawyer 
_character_quotient.pdf. These findings and others are summarized in Joan W. Howarth & Judith Welch 
Wegner, Ringing Changes: Systemic Legal Licensing Reform, 13 FIU L. REV. 383, 399-406 (2019). Bar 
examiners have not yet determined how to incorporate these studies into licensing requirements. 
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primarily about doctrinal coverage, and attempting to match, somehow, the 
rules tested with the rules to be used in practice. 
This tendency to prioritize knowledge over skills is exemplified by the 
response of the National Conference of Bar Examiners (NCBE) to their 2012 
job performance study. Of the knowledge, skills, and abilities considered, 
the top twenty-five rated by participants in the NCBE study as most 
significant to their practice were skills and abilities, not knowledge. The 
knowledge domain rated as most significant, Rules of Civil Procedure, came 
in twenty-sixth.3 Shortly thereafter, the NCBE completed its planned 
expansion of the doctrinal knowledge required for the Multistate Bar Exam 
by adding Civil Procedure.4 Testing for knowledge is easier than testing for 
skills and abilities; testing for doctrinal knowledge is especially easy. 
III. ONE KIND OF KNOWLEDGE, ONE ANALYTICAL SKILL 
Bar exams rest on the fallacy that the necessary knowledge base consists 
of legal doctrine or rules. Whatever the knowledge that every competent 
lawyer must possess, it is much more than rules.5 What about knowledge of 
legal methods, culture, or strategies? Bar exams can test these kinds of legal 
knowledge; Ontario’s multiple-choice questions require knowledge of law 
office management and strategy related to litigation, deal-making, and 
planning.6 We should improve attorney licensing to take account of these 
broader categories of legal knowledge that are crucial for minimal 
competence. My primary focus here, however, is the subcategory of legal 
knowledge that dominates licensing, knowledge of rules or doctrine. 
Pragmatism explains examiners’ long-standing concentration on 
doctrinal knowledge. Knowledge of rules is relatively easy to test. Even 
more important, some doctrinal knowledge base is required to test the 
 
3 See Steven Nettles & James Hellrung (AMP), Nat’l Conf. of Bar Examiners, A Study of the Newly 
Licensed Lawyer (2012). For discussion of this job analysis, see Susan M. Case, The NCBE Job Analysis: 
A Study of Newly Licensed Lawyer, B. EXAM’R at 52 (Mar. 2013), available at https://thebarexaminer.org 
/wp-content/uploads/ PDFs/820113testingcolumn.pdf. Eighty-six percent of respondents reported using 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The percentage of respondents that reported using the twenty-five skills or 
abilities rated as more significant ranged from 89% to 100%, with 99% the mode and median. Id. at 53. 
4  Case, supra note 3, at 53. 
5 Most U.S. jurisdictions now require candidates to take one or two performance tests as 
components of the bar exam, in addition to essays and multiple-choice questions. Performance tests 
assess a wider range of legal skills, including readings of statutes and cases, case synthesis, document 
drafting, project management, and higher order analytical skills necessary to handle more complexity 
and uncertainty in both factual settings and legal rules. Multistate Performance Tests currently take 25% 
of the time of the Uniform Bar Exam and account for 20% of its score. See NAT’L CONF. OF BAR 
EXAMINERS, Uniform Bar Examination (2019), available at http://www.ncbex.org/exams/ube/ (last 
visited June 14, 2019). NAT’L CONF. OF BAR EXAMINERS, UNDERSTANDING THE UNIFORM BAR EXAM 
(1984), available at http://www.ncbex.org/pdfviewer/?file=%2Fdmsdocument%2F209%20rather%20 
than%20the%20 page%20itself.%20Supplying%20the%20pdf. 
6 See LAW SOC’Y OF ONTARIO, Licensing Examinations, available at https://lso.ca/becoming-
licensed/lawyer-licensing-process/licensing-examinations (last visited June 14, 2019); see also Andrea 
A. Curcio, Carol L. Chomsky & Eileen Kaufman, How to Build a Better Bar Exam, N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N 
J. 37, 38-40 (2018). 
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foundational legal skill of applying legal rules to new facts. Although not 
the only lawyering skill necessary for minimal competence, the legal 
analytical skill or method of applying rules to new facts is foundational, 
dominating law school and bar exams. 
Given this relentless emphasis on doctrinal knowledge, licensing 
authorities are long overdue to turn more serious attention to the difficult 
question of what doctrinal knowledge is necessary to be a competent lawyer 
today. What legal rules must every competent lawyer know? 
IV. LEGAL EDUCATION PROVIDES LESS OF AN ANSWER THAN MAY 
APPEAR 
Academic programs of professional schools are important evidence of 
what knowledge, skills and abilities are required for professional 
competence.7 Bar examiners reasonably point to the uniformity and stability 
of law school curricula, especially in the first year, as evidence of the 
importance of those doctrinal subjects to competence as an attorney. A 
closer look reveals cracks.   
Consider that law schools, unlike medical schools, do not impose any 
prerequisites or academic coursework that must have been successfully 
completed prior to law school. Indeed, law schools celebrate the diversity of 
academic backgrounds of our student bodies, believing that part of our 
gatekeeping function includes building a profession that incorporates 
backgrounds in science and the humanities, music theory and business, 
engineering and women’s studies, and anything else. 
Whatever it is that lawyers must know, we do not require any of it to be 
learned prior to law school.8 
V. ACCREDITATION STANDARDS DO NOT HELP 
Law school accreditation standards offer surprisingly few hints about 
what knowledge is necessary for attorney competence.  ABA Standard 302 
focuses on lawyer competence by requiring each law school to establish 
“Learning Outcomes” for four key aspects of lawyer competence, starting 
with “Knowledge and understanding of substantive and procedural law.”9 
 
7 “[W]e should expect a high degree of overlap between the content of professional school curricula 
and the content of licensure and certification examinations, since both presumably emphasize knowledge 
and skills that are viewed as needed for effective practice.” Michael T. Kane, The Future of Testing for 
Licensure and Certification Examinations, in THE FUTURE OF TESTING 145 (Barbara S. Plake & Joseph 
C. Witt eds., 1986). 
8 This may be a mistake. One solution to weak prior education related to civics and government 
would be to add a knowledge component to the LSAT, similarly to the science knowledge tested on the 
admissions test for medical school. Alternatively, LSAC could work with the Khan Academy to provide 
online courses on these subjects that law schools could require prior to matriculation. 
9 AM. BAR ASS’N, Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools §303 at 16 
(2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/standards.html [hereinafter 
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This glaring failure to attempt any specificity is a clue about how difficult it 
is to know what lawyers must know.  
ABA accreditation standards do establish multiple specific curricular 
requirements, including that each student have two different faculty-
supervised writing experiences and at least six credit hours of experiential 
courses that "integrate doctrine, theory, skills, and legal ethics” while 
engaging students in performance of identified professional skills.10 
Substantial opportunities for law clinics or field placements and pro bono 
participation are also required. But Professional Responsibility is the only 
area of substantive law mentioned, and therefore the only doctrinal subject 
that accreditors require law students to take.11 
Law school curricular uniformity is driven by factors other than 
accreditation pressure. One such force is the strong collective proclivity of 
legal academics toward tradition.  Through training and personality, 
academic lawyers share the inclination of lawyers to look backwards for 
authority while valuing order, hierarchy, and predictability. Academic 
lawyers have doubled down on order, hierarchy, and predictability by 
choosing university settings over the pressures, risks, and rewards of 
practice. This partly answers why, with too few exceptions, we are 
untroubled by our roles delivering a curriculum that remains remarkably 
unchanged since it was invented in 1870. In the memorable words of 
Professor Ed Rubin, legal education uses an educational model that “treats 
the entire twentieth century like a passing annoyance.”12 
VI. LAW SCHOOLS ARE SURPRISINGLY REMOVED FROM THE PRACTICE OF 
LAW 
For complex historical reasons related to the contested move to 
university-based legal education, most law schools have been extremely 
focused on the academic study of law, not preparation for the practice of 
law.13 This culture was enabled by the prior culture of elite law firm 
employers preferring to do their own training,14 a tradition that helps to 
explain why law schools require little clinical experience compared to 
 
ABA STANDARDS]. The other required competencies are “[l]egal analysis and reasoning, legal research, 
problem solving, and written and oral communication in the legal context; Exercise of proper 
professional and ethical responsibilities to clients and the legal system; and Other professional skills 
needed for competent and ethical participation as a member of the legal profession.” Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Each student is required to complete at least two credits of “substantial instruction in rules of 
professional conduct, and the values and responsibilities of the legal profession and its members.” Id. 
12 Edward Rubin, What’s Wrong with Langdell’s Method, and What to Do About It, 60 VAND. L. 
REV. 609, 610 (2007). 
13 See Howarth & Wegner, supra note 2, at 428-30. 
14 Id. at 429, citing WILLIAM SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE 
PROFESSION OF LAW 91-125 (2007). 
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virtually every other professional school.15 These habits enable the 
incapacity of most law professors—those who do not teach in clinics-- to 
know what practice requires. By contrast, medical school professors, 
including the most elite, continue to practice medicine by treating patients 
throughout their academic careers. Legal educators are not necessarily 
attuned to the changing needs of the profession. Law faculty who know little 
about practicing law know little about minimal competence.    
VII. LAW PROFESSORS TEACH ANALYTICAL METHODS 
Using traditional law school curricula to determine what doctrinal 
subject knowledge is required for minimal competence suffers from an even 
more profound complication. The longstanding practice of naming courses 
after their doctrinal subject matter hides the truth that these courses may 
have methodological goals that are at least as important, probably even more 
essential, than goals related to doctrinal knowledge.   
Consider Torts.  Law schools require students to take Torts, typically in 
the first semester of law school.  As a Torts professor, I believe that the Torts 
course includes some knowledge that every lawyer must understand. This 
necessary knowledge base includes differences between civil and criminal 
law; common law development; burdens of proof; standards of review; 
differences between standards and rules; distinctions between elements and 
factors; differing roles of judges and juries, and of courts and legislatures; 
burdens of production and proof; the impact of procedural context on 
doctrinal analysis; the purposes and limitations of systems for allocating the 
costs of accidents; the fault continuum of intentional, reckless, negligent 
conduct and strict liability; the elements of negligence, and of some 
intentional torts; causation principles; common defenses and privileges; 
theories of liability for injuries from products; and types of damages.  The 
doctrinal portion of this inventory is relatively limited. 
By contrast, the Torts doctrinal knowledge base required for the 
Multistate Bar Exam is quite extensive, covering many more areas of torts 
doctrine than I have identified as necessary for competence, and 
significantly more doctrine than is regularly covered in a four-credit Torts 
 
15 Peter A. Joy, The Uneasy History of Experiential Education in U.S. Law Schools, 122 DICK. L. 
REV. 551 (2018). 
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class.16 The Torts knowledge base required for licensure as a Solicitor in the 
United Kingdom is similar, but less extensive.17 
We should be neither surprised nor troubled that Torts survives in the 
required curriculum untouched by the steep decline in the percentage of 
attorneys who handle tort matters.18 Law schools do not require Torts 
because attorneys will practice personal injury law or will use much Torts 
doctrine. The course is foundational because Torts makes an excellent 
platform for learning basic legal analysis, including the application of legal 
doctrine to facts, burdens of proof, elements versus factors, and arguments 
based on precedent, analogy, and policy considerations. Some professors use 
Torts as a platform for teaching legal theory, whether law and economics, 
theories of distributive justice, or something else. We teach Torts to 
everyone because we believe it to be an effective platform for introducing 
necessary skills of legal analysis. 
The concept that legal reasoning trumps doctrinal subject matter in 
learning goals of the traditional core curriculum is reflected in the decision 
of one of our newest law schools, the University of California Irvine School 
of Law, to rename its first year courses as types of analysis: “Torts” became 
“Common Law Analysis: Torts” “Criminal Law” became “Statutory 
Analysis.”19 The remarkable staying power of the Langdellian first year 
curriculum rests on the usefulness of these doctrinal subjects as platforms 
for teaching and learning methods of analysis, not the necessity for or even 
likelihood of using the doctrinal knowledge in practice. In other words, law 
schools continue to require subjects that are useful platforms for teaching 
fundamental legal analysis in the same way that bar examiners continue to 
test subjects that are useful platforms for testing fundamental legal analysis 
 
16 See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS, 2019 MBE Subject Matter Outline at 8, 
available at http://www.ncbex.org/pdfviewer/?file=%2Fdmsdocument%2F226.  
17 Statement of Legal Knowledge, THE U.K. SOLIC. REG. AUTH., https://www.sra.org.uk/ 
knowledge/# (last visited Oct. 25, 2018). “The Statement of Legal Knowledge sets out the knowledge 
that solicitors are required to demonstrate at the point of qualification.” Id. 
18 “Tort cases declined from 16% of civil filings in state courts in 1993 to about 4% in 2015, a 
difference of more than 1.7 million cases nationwide, according to an analysis of annual reports from the 
National Center for State Courts.” Joe Palazzolo, We Won’t See You in Court: The Era of Torts Lawsuits 
is Waning, WALL ST. J. (July 24, 2017, 5:09 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/we-wont-see-you-in-
court-the-era-of-tort-lawsuits-is-waning-1500930572.  
19 The UCI School of Law course catalog describes the course as “consider[ing] the law of 
negligence, products liability, and intentional wrongdoing to examine how courts make rules, how those 
rules change over time, and the role of lawyers in causing such change.” See Law 501 SEC 1 – Common 
Law Analysis: Torts, U.C. IRVINE SCH. OF L., https://apps.law.uci.edu/CourseCatalog/cap_details.aspx? 
id=1935 (last visited Sept. 22, 2019). Similarly, the course description for “Common Law Analysis: 
Contracts” explains that “[t]his course will focus primarily on the common law of contracts to teach this 
method of analysis, in which the law is derived from judicial decisions rather than statutes or the 
Constitution.” See Law 501 SEC 1 – Common Law Analysis: Contracts, U.C. IRVINE SCH. OF L., 
https://apps.law.uci.edu/CourseCatalog/cap_details.aspx?id =1601 (last visited Sept. 22, 2019). By 
contrast, the first year required course that covers criminal law is called “Statutory Analysis” and 
described as “us[ing] criminal law as a basis for teaching students the methods employed in all areas of 
law for analyzing statutes.” See Law 503 SEC 1 – Statutory Analysis, U.C. IRVINE SCH. OF L., https://apps 
.law.uci.edu/CourseCatalog/cap_details.aspx?id=1951 (last visited Sept. 22, 2019). 
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skills. The selection of doctrinal subjects to be tested on bar exams probably 
has little relationship to attorney competence, meaning little relationship to 
the law most attorneys will use in practice. Instead, the stability of the core 
subjects rest on the benefits of using a standard common law doctrinal 
platform for testing legal method, particularly the application of legal rules 
to new facts. 
VIII. A CIRCULAR DILEMMA: LAW SCHOOL CURRICULA ARE SHAPED BY 
BAR EXAMS 
Another important reason that law school curricula fail as meaningful 
guides to attorney competence is that bar exams determine what is taught in 
law school as much as what is taught in law school determines what is tested 
on bar exams.20 
Most law schools face direct and increasing pressure to shape their 
course coverage for bar passage.21 Preparing to pass a bar exam is not the 
same as preparing for competence in practice, and current licensing exams 
test such a narrow set of skills (primarily first year skills of doctrinal 
analysis) that preparing for bar exam success can draw students away from 
coursework that prepare them for practice, such as clinical courses in which 
law students represent clients.22 
IX. BAR EXAMINERS TEST DOCTRINAL KNOWLEDGE NO LONGER TAUGHT 
Increasing pressure to prepare law students for practice has changed 
traditional course credit allocations.  Many law schools have reduced the 
credits given to traditional first year courses such as Civil Procedure, 
Contracts, Torts, and Property in part to make room in the curriculum for 
 
20 See Joan W. Howarth, Teaching in the Shadow of the Bar, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 927, 928-29 (1997). 
This is not true at the most elite law schools. Their students are exceptionally good test-takers who can 
pass current bar exams without taking many bar courses. For example, neither Yale nor Michigan 
requires J.D. students to take Corporations, Evidence, Property, or any UCC course beyond introductory 
Contracts. See JD Degree Requirements, YALE L. SCH., https://law.yale.edu/study-law-yale/degree-
programs/jd-program/jd-degree-requirements (last visited Sept. 22, 2019); Course List, UNIV. OF MICH. 
L. SCH., https://www.law. umich.edu/CurrentStudents/Registration/ClassSchedule/Pages/CourseList. 
aspx (last visited Sept. 22, 2019); J.D. students at Harvard are required to take Property but not 
Constitutional Law, Evidence, Corporations, or any UCC course beyond introductory Contracts. See 
First-Year J.D. Course and Credit Requirements, HARV. L. SCH., https://hls.harvard.edu/dept/academics/ 
handbook/rules-relating-to-law-school-studies/requirements-for-the-j-d-degree/c-first-year-j-d-course-
and-credit-requirements/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2019). Beyond the obvious explanation that admission to 
the “best” law schools and to the profession turns on multiple-choice testing expertise, we might think 
about what it means that these law schools are the least wedded to the knowledge base considered crucial 
by bar examiners. 
21 See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS, supra note 9, at 16 (requiring 75% bar passage within two years of 
graduation). 
22 See, e.g., Deborah J. Merritt, Experiential Education and Bar Passage, L. SCH. CAFÉ (Jan. 22, 
2016), https://www.lawschoolcafe.org/2016/01/22/experiential-education-and-bar-passage/.  
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more experiential coursework and specialized courses. Bar examiners still 
test for the doctrinal subject matter content that was covered when core first 
year courses were six units stretched over two semesters. They are ignoring 
the trend of the last thirty years to shrink the credits given for the core first 
year subjects, while adding new first year courses (e.g., administrative law, 
lawyering courses) and new upper level offerings (more clinics, externships, 
and practice-oriented courses). The subject outlines of the doctrinal 
knowledge tested on bar exams courses have not shrunk, but the law school 
courses have.  Bar examiners should immediately take the easy first step of 
limiting their doctrinal coverage to what is currently typically taught, even 
as they contemplate what deeper reforms are called for by the more profound 
changes in the profession and education in recent years. 
X. WHAT DID BAR EXAMINERS TEST 100 YEARS AGO? 
Attorney licensing can be as tradition-bound as legal education.  
Today’s bar exam emphasis on doctrinal knowledge has deep roots, starting 
over a century ago when written attorney licensing tests were still new.23 
The subjects tested then are remarkably like those tested today, as are some 
of the rules being tested. The format was short answer. Some of the questions 
called for definitions, a more purely knowledge question than used today, 
without much analytical skill required.24 Many of the questions from a 
century ago, however, present fact patterns that could show up on today’s 
Multistate Bar Exam (MBE) with minor factual adjustments. For example, 
Ohio bar examiners asked candidates in 1908 to consider whether the dawn 
of the automobile age created a duty of a shopkeeper to tie up his team of 
horses: 
A grocer leaves his delivery team, as was his custom, untied 
in front of his place of business. B., in passing with his 
automobile, frightened the team and caused it to run away, 
and in so doing it ran into the carriage of C. and injured his 
 
23 Jurisdictions used oral tests for attorneys until the beginning of the twentieth century when written 
tests became common. ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 
1850S TO THE 1980S (1983). In 1915, the American Bar Association urged states to elevate their standards 
by requiring law school and passage of an examination for licensure. The Standard Rules for Admission 
to the Bar: As Adopted by the Section of Legal Education and Recommended to the American Bar 
Association, 4 AM. L. SCH. REV. 201 (1915-22). 
24 The Torts section of the 1910 Massachusetts bar exam started with the following question: “1. 
Define the following and give examples: (a) The fellow servant rule; (b) The assumption of risk doctrine; 
(c) The doctrine of contributory negligence.” Recent State Bar Examination Questions, 2 AM. L. SCH. 
REV. 559, 565 (1911) (from Mass. Bar Exam, 12/31/1910). My students would be pleased to be asked 
similarly definitional questions such as these asked by Ohio bar examiners in 1909: “74. Distinguish 
between a tort and a contract; 75. What is meant by proximate cause? Illustrate by example.” State Bar 
Examination Questions, 2 AM. L. SCH. REV. 524, 530 (1911) (OH 12/7-8/1909). 
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minor son. Against whom, if anyone, can C. recover for the 
injury?25 
Longevity does not necessarily signal value, but the analytical skill of 
applying legal doctrine to new fact scenarios tested in such questions is still 
fundamental to competent lawyering. The analytical skill remains 
fundamental, but a bigger question is whether the necessary doctrinal 
knowledge base has stayed the same over a century. Does minimal 
competence today mean the same breadth and depth of knowledge of the 
rules of Torts, Contracts, Procedure, Evidence, Criminal Law, 
Constitutional Law, Agency, Secured Transactions, and Equity that were 
tested a century ago? Profound changes in the profession suggest 
otherwise.26 A hundred years ago an attorney was a generalist who needed a 
broad knowledge base in his (or rarely her) memory to practice competently. 
There were fewer courts and less law.27 Doctrine changed more slowly, and 
law books were expensive and hard to get. The doctrinal knowledge required 
for competence in the twenty-first century must be different from what was 
necessary to be learned (and memorized) a hundred years ago. 
XI. WHAT LAW MUST LAWYERS KNOW NOW? 
Professional standards for licensing tests require examiners to keep tests 
current by regularly reviewing changes in the profession.28 The legal 
profession has changed profoundly over the last several decades, but the 
structure and coverage of bar exams have not kept up with these breathtaking 
changes.29 Bar exams consist of multiple-choice questions, essays, and 
performance tests, the same components of the bar exam I took in California 
 
25 State Bar Examination Questions, 2 AM. L. SCH. REV. 524 (1911) (OH 12/7-8/1909). 
26 “Test design generally starts with an adequate definition of the occupation or specialty . . . Then 
the nature and requirements of the occupation, in its current form, are delineated.” 2014 STANDARDS, 
supra note 1, at 174-75 (emphasis added). 
27 Question 34 of the 1910 Pennsylvania bar exam illustrates that novice attorneys had less law to 
learn in the early 20th Century: “Briefly explain the leading principles, or rules of law, applicable to the 
interpretation of the Constitution of the United States, and in what respects, if any, these rules differ from 
the rules applicable to the interpretation of the Constitution of the state of Pennsylvania.” 2 AM. L. SCH. 
REV., supra note 24, at 571 (PA 12/6-7/1910). 
28 “Practice in professions and occupations often changes over time. [. . .] Each profession or 
occupation should periodically reevaluate the knowledge and skills measured in its examination used to 
meet the requirements of the credential.” 2014 STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 176–77. 
29 Bar examiners have been more successful in keeping up with the evolving standards for high-
stakes testing concerning more professional question design, test administration, and scoring, especially 
related to reliability. Bar examiners have focused on reliability, making sure that a score’s meaning stays 
the same, but not yet sufficiently on validity, making sure that the exam tests what it purports to test, 
minimum competence to practice law. Testing the law that lawyers need to know is a validity 
requirement. 
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in 1980. The doctrinal subjects tested are the same, too, although often in 
more detail today. 
More rules are tested today than thirty years ago because there are more 
rules to be tested. The amount of law has exploded. This growth has changed 
the profession by leading to ubiquitous specialization in uncountable 
settings. This radical dispersion of our profession – we are everywhere – 
means that the legal doctrine used in practice differs profoundly from one 
lawyer to the next. Considering this extreme diffusion of lawyering roles, if 
a core doctrinal knowledge base likely to be used in practice exists, it is 
small. Perhaps changes in the profession are sufficiently profound that a 
specific doctrinal knowledge base required of all competent attorneys has 
vanished along with lawyers who do not specialize. Technological changes 
and the diversity of position and role may have rendered obsolete the quaint 
notion of a common knowledge core required for competence. 
This shift should not be surprising. The encyclopedic books of rules to 
be memorized for bar exams cover much more than what is typically even 
mentioned in required law school courses, but even these thick books do not 
reach the law that most attorneys will use in practice.  Specialization is the 
main reason that a common core of required knowledge is obsolete, but the 
growth of the regulatory state is also very important. Statutes and regulations 
dominate legal practice but are typically ignored on bar exams. 
Another complication arises from the differences between the general 
rules tested on the multistate tests versus the state rules tested on state-
specific questions. Applicants in many states today must memorize one set 
of general rules for the MBE and conflicting state rules for state-constructed 
essays. The Uniform Bar Exam eliminates that problem by testing only 
general rules. Of course, these rules memorized for the bar exam are not 
specific to any state, which is why critics dub the doctrine tested by the 
Uniform Bar Exam as “the law of nowhere.” 
If bar examiners were correct that competence is established by 
memorizing and applying rules that will be used in practice, these many 
layers of differences between what is tested and what is used would be 
deeply problematic. But reconceptualizing the level of knowledge required 
for licensing—replacing recall with familiarity--eliminates the problem of 
differences between the law learned for the test and the law to be used in 
practice. 
XII. KNOWLEDGE AS FAMILIARITY, NOT MEMORIZATION 
A broad doctrinal knowledge base is highly relevant to attorney 
competence if we understand “knowledge” to mean familiarity. Competent 
lawyers are adept at the categorical thinking or legal method we identify as 
“issue spotting.” Exposure to multiple doctrinal subjects helps attorneys 
recognize categories of problems, or spot issues.  In this way a wide doctrinal 
 12 CONNECTICUT PUBLIC INTEREST LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19.1 
 
 
 
knowledge base is very useful for issue spotting, a foundational lawyering 
skill. Bar examiners confuse the doctrinal knowledge that should be familiar 
with the doctrinal knowledge that must be memorized.30 
Bar examiners resent and resist the characterization of bar exams as tests 
of memorization, insisting instead that bar exams test legal analysis.31 But 
current tests do both.  Bar examiners test legal analysis by requiring 
applicants to memorize the online equivalent of thick books of rules. 
Memorization of these rules is unnecessary and, worse, directly contrary to 
the habits of relentless authority checks required for competence in law 
practice.  This is especially true now that everyone with a smart phone 
carries a complete law library in their pocket.  Memorization is particularly 
wrongheaded when we consider the rules being memorized may conflict 
with the rules that apply in the jurisdiction doing the testing. 
The technical fix for eliminating memorization is easy: examiners can 
move to open book licensing tests, as are used in Ontario32 and by some 
Uniform Bar Exam jurisdictions to test state-specific doctrine.33 
XIII. MOVING FORWARD 
Very fast but shallow legal reasoning – applying uncontested facts to 
artificially stable (and memorized) rules -- is the hallmark of today’s bar 
examinations.  Mechanical application of legal rules to new facts is a crucial 
and foundational aspect of attorney competence that should be tested by 
licensing authorities. But this is the skill of a novice law student, not a novice 
lawyer.  Real lawyering requires creative judgment to handle uncertain facts 
and ambiguous law. Licensing authorities should test the foundational skill 
of mechanical application of facts to legal rules as a first stage of licensing.34  
This basic skill of legal analysis can be tested using a subset of doctrine, 
perhaps Torts, Contracts, and Civil Procedure as covered in four-unit 
 
30 Cognitive domains and knowledge are more complex than my simple distinction between 
familiarity and memorization suggests. See, e.g., A TAXONOMY FOR LEARNING, TEACHING, AND 
ASSESSING: A REVISION OF BLOOM’S TAXONOMY OF EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES (Lorin W. Anderson, 
et al. eds., 2001) (describing the cognitive process dimension as lower to higher order thinking skills of 
remembering, understanding, applying, analyzing, evaluating and creating and the knowledge dimension 
as factual, conceptual, procedural, and metacognitive knowledge). 
31 E.g., Rebecca White Berch, Letter from the Chair, 87 THE BAR EXAM’R 1-2 (2018), available at 
https://thebarexaminer.org/article/summer-2018/letter-from-the-chair/. 
32 See L. SOC’Y OF ONTARIO, supra note 6; Curcio et al., supra note 6. 
33 For example, New York supplements the Uniform Bar Exam with the New York Licensing Exam, 
a two-hour, open book multiple-choice test of New York law. See N.Y. ST. BRD. OF L. EXAM’RS, Uniform 
Bar Exam, New York Law Course, and New York Law Exam, https://www.nybarexam.org/UBE/UBE. 
html (last visited Jun. 23, 2019). 
34 See Howarth & Wegner, supra note 2, at 425-27. 
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courses. This first stage licensing exam could be given as soon as the 
applicant has finished these courses. 
This early test to ensure basic legal reasoning ability opens possibilities 
for later assessment of higher order thinking skills and a broader range of 
lawyering skills. For example, a later post-graduation bar exam could be 
comprised entirely of performance tests that align more closely with legal 
practice than essay or multiple-choice questions. Performance tests today 
provide candidates with a case file and library of legal sources to be used to 
complete lawyering tasks, such as client letters, memos, or discovery 
documents.35 The performance test is the only bar exam component not 
designed to test substantive doctrinal knowledge. Legal methods, including 
critical reading of cases, statutes, and regulations can be assessed by 
performance tests. Providing both relevant and irrelevant materials in the 
library would test more advanced legal analysis and legal research skills. 
Bar examiners could encourage familiarity with a broad range of 
doctrinal areas by providing a list in advance of the potential subjects of the 
performance tests, which could be extensive. Candidates could also be 
motivated to familiarize themselves with the variety of legal documents 
listed as potential performance test tasks. In these ways bar exams would 
more closely simulate law practice. 
XIV. CONCLUSION 
Bar examiners continue to operate as though memorization of a broad 
base of legal doctrine will prepare novice attorneys to handle whatever legal 
problems they may confront. This premise makes bar exams difficult for the 
wrong reasons (memorization of encyclopedic books of rules and 
requirements of high speed) and otherwise too easy, especially for excellent 
multiple-choice test-takers. Attorney licensing will become more aligned 
with minimal competence and thus offer better public protection when 
examiners reconceptualize how and why doctrinal knowledge is important. 
The primary purpose of bar exams should be to test competence in legal 
methods, including legal analysis, not legal knowledge. The crucial purpose 
for doctrinal knowledge in bar exams is to provide the platform to test legal 
analysis. And, regarding knowledge, bar exams will be better when their 
focus expands to forms of legal knowledge beyond doctrine, including 
knowledge of methods, skills, and strategy. Attorneys should be familiar 
with a broad swath of legal doctrine in order to spot legal issues, but the 
ability to memorize all those rules is no measure of competence. 
The most valuable aspect of knowledge-based competence in an 
attorney today is understanding what we do not know and then how to find 
 
35 See NAT’L CONF. OF BAR EXAM’RS, Multistate Performance Test, http://www.ncbex.org/ 
exams/mpt/ (last visited Jun. 23, 2019). 
 14 CONNECTICUT PUBLIC INTEREST LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19.1 
 
 
 
it, understand it, and use it. More than ever before, knowing when and how 
to find legal knowledge is more critical than the knowledge itself. 
 
 
 
